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Abstract
In 2009, the United Kingdom changed from a worldwide to a territorial tax system
which exempts all foreign active income from taxation at home. This reform decreased
the dividend tax imposed on UK multinationals in many low tax countries without
changing the dividend tax on foreign repatriations from high tax countries. In this
paper I assess the causal e¤ect of dividend exemption on real outbound investment
by UK multinationals, using data on multinational a¢ liates located in 27 European
countries and employing the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. I nd that the tax
reform has increased the outbound investment rate of UK multinationals by around
15.7 percentage points in countries with a lower corporate tax rate than the UK. The
nding represents an increase in aggregate outbound investment, as there is no evidence
on a concurrent decrease in investment by UK multinationals in the high-tax countries
or in the UK. The territorial tax reform is estimated to have a strong bang for the
buck e¤ect: there is a £ 9 increase in the outbound investment of UK multinationals
for each £ 1 of domestic tax revenue loss.
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I Introduction
Many countries have been trying to create a competitive tax system to attract surging
outbound investment from multinational rms over the past few decades, given that taxes
are important in determining the after-tax protability of internationally mobile capital in
di¤erent locations. While there has been considerable debate about taxing inbound foreign
direct investment (FDI), much less is discussed on the role of tax policies on outbound
investment. One notable exception is the current policy debate on whether the United
States should move to a territorial tax system, which calls for evidence on the likely e¤ect
of the reform on the allocation of investment between domestic and foreign locations as well
as on the pattern of U.S. investment abroad.
In this paper, I provide the rst micro-level evidence on the causal e¤ect of home country
taxation on the location of investment by multinationals, by exploiting the UKs recent
change from worldwide to territorial taxation. The key di¤erence between the two tax
systems is in the home taxation of foreign-earned prots. Broadly speaking, the worldwide
system aims to tax foreign prots at the same home country rate regardless of where the
prots arise. Most countries with a worldwide system allow deferral of tax on active income
until repatriation and provide a credit for foreign taxes paid up to the limit of the tax that
is due on the income in the home country to avoid double taxation. The territorial system,
on the other hand, largely exempts foreign prots from taxation in the home country. The
relevant tax on a cross-border investment, therefore, is the higher of the home and host
country rate under the worldwide system and the host country rate (plus any withholding
taxes due to the host country, if applicable) under the territorial system.1 Currently 28 out
of 34 OECD countries have a territorial system, while the credit-based worldwide system
is used by the rest of OECD countries including the United States, and some other large
economies such as China and Russia.
1It is clear that the two international tax systems can in principle have di¤erent e¤ects on the allocation
of multinational investment between domestic and foreign activities and the pattern of foreign activities
abroad. Since under the worldwide or credit system the home country tax rate is the relevant tax for all
income, the rm is indi¤erent based on tax consideration whether to invest at home or abroad (capital
export neutrality). On the other hand, rms in high-tax credit countries face a higher tax when competing
in foreign markets with other rms subject only to the same local (host country) tax burdens, which may
distort international cross-ownership of assets (Desai and Hines, 2003). In addition, rms under the credit
system may strategically invest in the high-tax countries to benet from cross-crediting, which may also
distort international allocation of real investment. Under the territorial or exemption system, the host
country tax rate is the relevant tax for multinational income, so a rms investment is sensitive to the host
country tax di¤erences. Devereux, Fuest and Lockwood (2015) synthesizes and extends the literature on the
optimal taxation of foreign source income by showing that with a non-zero adjustment cost, the domestic tax
on foreign-source income should always be set to ensure the optimal allocation of the mobile factor between
domestic and foreign assets. The home country taxation should follow the classical rules in the literature;
national optimality requires the deduction rule, and global optimality requires the credit rule.
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In 2009, the UK fundamentally changed its taxation of foreign prots by exempting
dividends that UK parent companies receive from their foreign subsidiaries from UK taxation
altogether. Before the reform, a¢ liates from countries where the statutory tax rate is lower
than the UK faced additional tax on dividend repatriations, where the level of the dividend
tax was the di¤erence between the home and host country tax rates. Consequently, the
reform decreased the tax burden by the amount of tax di¤erential for a¢ liates in the low tax
countries. On the other hand, as there was no additional tax on dividend repatriations from
countries with a higher statutory tax rate than the UK, the dividend tax faced by a¢ liates
in the high tax countries did not change throughout the reform and remained at zero.
I use a simple investment model based on Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2005) and Chetty
and Saez (2010) to understand the potential e¤ects of the reform on the level of investment
by UK multinationals, which depends critically on the nancing of investment. Specically,
dividend exemption would only increase the after-tax return on investment if a foreign af-
liate reinvests all the prots in the host country and rely on new equity from the parent
company to nance its investment at the margin. This result represents the old view of
dividend taxation in the context of cross-border investment.2 Alternatively, if the foreign
a¢ liate repatriates part of its prots to the parent company by paying a dividend and n-
ances the marginal investment with retained earnings, a dividend tax cut would have no
e¤ect on the cost of capital, a result rst suggested in Hartman (1985). This is because with
a permanent dividend tax in place, the foreign a¢ liate is indi¤erent between paying repat-
riation taxes now and paying repatriation taxes of the same present value later. However,
this irrelevance result no longer holds when there are anticipated or temporary dividend tax
changes. Anticipating a reduction in the dividend tax in the near future, the a¢ liate would
engage in intertemporal tax planning by postponing repatriations and increasing investment
before the reform.
According to the theory, we would only expect a positive e¤ect of the reform on foreign
investment by UK multinationals if they exhausted foreign earnings for reinvestment and
2Key theoretical studies on the e¤ect of dividend taxes on investments include Poterba and Summers
(1984), King (1974, 1977), Auerbach (1979, 1981, 1983), and Bradford (1981). Hartman (1985) extends
the analysis to study the e¤ect of dividend taxes on cross-border investment by multinationals. Auerbach
(2002) provides an excellent summary of the debate between the new and old theories of dividend taxa-
tion. Recent empirical work providing supportive evidence on the e¤ect of dividend tax cut on domestic
investment includes Chetty and Saez (2005), Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2011), and Campbell et al.
(2013), while Yagan (2015) nds no evidence that dividend tax cut increases corporate investment in the
U.S. Alstadsæter, Jacob and Michaely (2015) and Mathur et al. (2015) reconcile competing results from
the two views by providing empirical evidence on the heterogenous e¤ects of dividend taxes which depends
critically on nancing. Gourio and Miao (2011) provides similar evidence on the heterogeneous e¤ects of the
2003 dividend tax cut using simulation results from a dynamic general equilibrium model.
.
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issued new equity as the marginal source of nance. While this might be the case for a small
number of UK multinationals, the amount of repatriation taxes in the UK was small but
positive prior to the reform. According to HMRC (2008)3, the estimated foregone revenue
as a result of the tax reform was around £ 660 millions in 2009-2011 and was less than one
percent of corporation tax revenues at the time. For the small group of dividend paying
multinationals, the reform should not change their cost of capital as they rely on retained
earnings as the marginal source of nance. However, given that there was limited amount
of tax revenue raised from dividend repatriation, it could also be the case that the majority
of UK multinationals managed to bring income home tax free through some complicated
schemes under the worldwide tax system. If so, the reform would also make no di¤erence
to their cost of capital since they never paid the tax in the rst place. Instead, the reform
eliminated the costs of tax planning on the bulk of o¤shore earnings which can be viewed as an
implicit tax on dividend repatriation.4 So for the majority of non-tax paying multinationals,
we may also expect a positive e¤ect of the reform on their investment due to the reduction
in the implicit tax on dividend repatriation.
By exploiting the 2009 reform as a quasi-experiment, I test for the causal e¤ect of di-
vidend taxation on the level of outbound FDI. The basic idea is that the reform specically
targeted at the UK multinationals and should have no direct impact on the after-tax re-
turn to investment by non-UK multinationals, which can be used as a control group in the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis. The advantage of the quasi-experiment setting is that it
separates the e¤ect of dividend tax cut from other contemporaneous economic shocks in-
cluding the nancial crisis. The identifying assumption underlying the research design is
that investment by UK and non-UK multinational a¢ liates would have trended similarly in
the absence of the tax reform. Graphical evidence shows similar trends in the investment
series before the reform, and results of the placebo tests suggest that there is no di¤erential
change in investment by UK a¢ liates relative to the control group in any of the three years
in the pre-reform period.
The empirical analysis uses unconsolidated nancial and ownership data on multinational
a¢ liates in EU27 between 2005 and 2011, complemented by information on country-level
corporate tax rates and other economic and governance characteristics. The main sample is
an unbalanced panel with annual observations from 131,614 multinational a¢ liates, of which
30,206 are UK a¢ liates. I obtain qualitatively similar results in regressions using a balanced
3HM Treasury, Pre-Budget Report, November 2008. (https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/hm-treasury-pre-budget-report-november-2008)
4In other words, while the e¤ective tax rate on actual repatriation may be small due to expert corporate
manipulation of foreign tax liability, the implicit repatriation tax rate on the bulk of o¤shore retained earning
could be much higher due to the implicit costs of tax planning and avoidance (Kleinbard, 2011).
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panel and a matched sample of rms with similar turnover, asset, and turnover growth rate.
I nd that dividend exemption increased investment by UK a¢ liates in the low-tax
countries. The nding is robust to controlling for a wide range of non-tax determinants
of cross-border investment decisions. Qualitatively, the introduction of territorial system
increased the gross investment rate by UK a¢ liates by 15.7 percentage points in the low tax
countries, in response to an average decrease of 9 percentage points in dividend tax on prot
repatriation. The nding of a signicant increase in investment in the low-tax countries
is also robust to changes in the sample (unbalanced and balanced panels), changes in the
control group (with and without parent companies subjecting to worldwide taxation, and
matched panels), inclusion of additional controls (with and without industry- and county-
level time trends, and with and without controlling for the euro crisis), investment measures
(gross investment and net investment), and outlier winsorization (at the 97.5th and 99th
percentiles).
There are considerable heterogeneous e¤ects of dividend exemption on investments by
UK multinational a¢ liates. The observed investment increase is mainly driven by nancially
constrained rms measured by the availability of free cash ow. At the same time, by
analyzing the likelihood of new equity issuance in a similar di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach,
I nd that the same group of cash constrained rms are also more likely to issue new equity
after the reform. The investment increase is concentrated in larger multinational group
measured by the total number of related companies and total assets. There is no signicant
change in employment, labor productivity or protability in the UK a¢ liates in the low-tax
countries, while there is a moderate increase in the average company wage rate. The evidence
suggests that workers may have also beneted from the reform by sharing the tax savings
with the company.
Investment increases in the low-tax countries represent an increase in aggregate outward
investment by UK multinationals. I nd no signicant investment response by UK a¢ liates
in the high-tax countries or at home following UKs switch to the territorial system using
a similar di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. The evidence suggests that there is an increase
in total investment rather than a reallocation of investment from home to abroad or from
the high to low tax countries. In aggregate, the investment increase in low tax countries
is estimated to be e5.6 billion, which is approximately 9 times the amount of estimated
foregone tax revenue. The tax reform has a strong bang for the buck e¤ect by stimulating
£ 9 of outbound UK investment for every £ 1 loss in domestic tax revenue.
This paper relates to several strands of literatures in corporate taxation and corporate
nance. First, it contributes to the large literature on FDI and taxation by quantifying the
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signicant role of home country tax.5 Second, it adds to the literature studying behavioral
responses of multinationals to the international tax system (Slemrod, 1990; Hines and Rice,
1994; Hines, 1996; Grubert, 1998; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2001; Foley et al., 2007; Graham,
Hanlon and Sheylin, 2010; Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes, 2011; Egger et al., 2015; Hasegawa
and Kiyota, 2015). While most of these papers focus on dividend payouts and tax planning
activities of multinationals, this paper joins Grubert and Mutti (2000), Altshuler, Grubert
and Newlon (2000), Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Hanlon, Lester and Verdi (2015) by
studying their real investment decisions. Third, it provides new evidence on the impact of
dividend taxation on cross-border investment and contributes to the debate between the old
view and the new view, where recent studies focusing on domestic investment Becker,
Jacob and Jacob (2013), Yagan (2015), and Alstadsæter, Jacob and Michaely (2015) provide
mixing evidence on this issue. Finally, it joins a small literature on the spillover e¤ect of
scal policy into other countries including Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Matheson,
Perry and Veung (2014), and IMF (2014).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the policy reform that provides
exogenous changes in the dividend taxes faced by UK multinationals. Section III provides a
simple conceptual framework on the e¤ect of dividend exemption on outward multinational
investment. Section IV describes the data used in empirical analysis. Section V discusses
the empirical strategy and specication. Section VI presents empirical results on the e¤ect
of dividend exemption on UK outbound investment in the low tax countries. Section VII
presents empirical evidence on investment in the high-tax countries and in the UK. Section
VIII discusses the implications of the ndings. Section IX briey concludes.
II The 2009 Territorial Tax Reform
In 2009, the UK switched to the territorial tax system with dividend exemption. Before
then, the UK taxed corporate income on a worldwide basis, meaning UK companies are
liable to corporation tax in the UK on their worldwide income from activities domestic and
abroad. Taxes are levied on foreign-earned income when remitted to the UK parent company
as dividends, with a credit for corporate taxes paid in the source country. For example, if
a UK multinational has an investment in Ireland, it will pay Irish tax at the rate of 12.5%.
When the Irish subsidiary remits prot by paying dividends to the UK parent, the prot is
further liable to a UK tax of 28% but net of the Irish tax paid, implying a dividend tax rate
5Most of the empirical literature on this topic, as recently surveyed by de Mooij and Ederveen (2003)
and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011), is concerned with identifying the inuence of host country on FDI, rather
than home country e¤ects.
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of 15.5%.6 The foreign tax credit is limited to the amount of corporation tax that would
have been paid if the prots were earned in the UK.
There is no additional tax on dividend payments from subsidiaries in countries where the
statutory corporate tax rate is higher compared to the UK. For example, foreign earnings in
France pay a French tax of 35%, which is higher than the UK rate. So the dividend payment
is not liable to any additional UK tax. In general, the additional UK tax on each pound
of repatriated dividend (UK;div) is the di¤erence between the statutory tax rate in the host
country ( j) and the UK rate (UK).
Given that the additional dividend tax places UK multinationals at a competitive dis-
advantage compared to rms in countries that exempt foreign earnings,7 the Treasury and
HMRC issued a discussion document in June 2007 proposing for the UK to go territorial.8
The territorial tax system was subsequently introduced in the Finance Bill 2009 and became
e¤ective on July 1, 2009. Since then, foreign-source dividends paid to the UK parent com-
panies are no longer liable for UK corporation tax.9 Depending on the level of corporation
tax in the host country, this reform brought di¤erential changes in dividend tax rates on
repatriation. Specically, the reform decreased the tax rate on dividends remitted from a
low-tax country from UK to  j but did not directly a¤ect the tax rate on dividends from
the high-tax countries:
Dividend Tax Reduction =
(
UK    j;  j  UK
0;  j > UK :
The tax di¤erential UK    j represents the maximum tax savings on £ 1 dividend repat-
riated from a low-tax country j. This is because under the worldwide system, the parent
company could use excess foreign tax credit arising from low-tax countrieseligible unrelieved
foreign taxto o¤set against dividend taxes from high-tax countries. While there was restric-
tions on the maximum amount of excess credits that could be used for o¤setting,10 allowing
for cross-crediting e¤ectively lowered the rate of dividend taxes in the low-tax countries.
6The corporate tax rate of 28 percent was the main rate on corporate taxable prot above £ 1.5 million
between nancial years 2008 and 2010. The main rate was reduced to 26 percent in 2011, 24 percent in 2012,
and 20 percent in 2015.
7The stated policy objective of this reform is to enhance the competitiveness and attractiveness of the
UK as a location for multinational business.(Parliamental Report, 2009)
8HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs, Taxation of the Foreign Prots of Companies: A Discussion
Document, June 2007 (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/E/B/consult_foreign_prots210607.pdf).
9Except where the receipt is similar to interest or distributions paid in respect of certain securities.
10Specically, the rate of credit for underlying tax on all foreign dividends paid crossborder is restricted
to the main UK rate. Eligible unrelieved foreign tax only arises on the highest level dividend that su¤ers
the 30% and cannot exceed 45%. No relief was available for any capped foreign tax on lower level dividends.
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From a practical perspective, the amount of foregone tax revenue related to the territoriality
reform was quite small, accounting for about one percent of total corporation taxes in the
UK.11 The small amount of revenue collected on dividend repatriation is consistent with two
alternative hypothesis. First, it may suggest that the bulk of foreign earnings are reinvested
instead of repatriated home. Alternatively, it may suggest that the bulk of foreign earnings
are brought back home, but through some complicated schemes of tax planning so most
multinationals avoided paying dividend taxes in the rst place. In the latter case, we may
still expect a positive e¤ect of the tax reform on foreign investment by reducing the implicit
costs of repatriation due to tax planning and avoidance.
III Conceptual Framework
I consider in a simple two-period model the e¤ect of dividend taxation on rm investment,
based on Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2005) and Chetty and Saez (2010). At the beginning
of period 0; a UK a¢ liate in the foreign market has an initial level of cash holdings of C.
In period 0 it invests an amount of I, which can be nanced out of retained earnings, or by
receiving new capital injection of E  0 from the parent company. At the end of period 0, the
foreign a¢ liate pays to its UK parent a dividend in the amount ofD = C+E I. In period 1,
the foreign a¢ liate produces output and earns revenue with the production function f(I; E),
where f() is strictly concave, strictly increasing, continuous and continuously di¤erentiable.
Note that the positive dependence of this production function on the level of new capital
reects possible control benets of subjecting the investment decision to scrutiny and
monitoring from the parent company. At the end of period 1, the a¢ liate repatriates the
entire net wealth to the UK parent company by paying a dividend. A tax rate of t0d and t
1
d
is levied on dividend payments in period 0 and 1, respectively.12 A tax rate of tc is levied on
corporate revenue in the second period.
The foreign a¢ liate chooses I and E to maximize the present value of net distributions,
given by:
V = (1  t0d)(C + E   I)  E + (1  t1d)(1  tc)f(I; E);
where  is the parent companys discount factor,  = 1
1+r
< 1, and r is the risk-free interest
11In relation to passive income, the controlled foreign companies (CFCs), e¤ective between 2001-02 and
2009-10, restricted the ability of UK-based groups to retain prots overseas without paying a full UK tax
charge. Specically, the retained prots of subsidiaries that are located in countries where the corporation
tax is less than three quarters of the rate applicable in the UK can be apportioned back to the UK and taxed
as income of the parent. UK parent companies were also liable to UK taxes on interest or royalties income
from foreign subsidiaries, with a credit for any withholding taxes paid abroad.
12To focus on the implication of dividend taxation for investment and new share issues, I assume that the
amount of debt nance is xed.
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rate between the two periods, subject to the non-negativity constraints on dividend payments
and new share issues. The foreign a¢ liate thus maximizes:
V = (1  t0d)(C + E   I)  E + D(C + E   I) + EE + (1  t1d)(1  tc)f(I; E);
where D and E are shadow values associated with the non-negativity constraints. The
rst-order conditions for investment and new equity issues are:
fI =
(1 + r)
(1  tc)

1  t0d
1  t1d
+
D
1  t1d

;
and
fE =
(1 + r)
(1  tc)

1  (1  t0d)  (D + E)
1  t1d

:
There are two nancial regimes in this model, which are depicted in Figure 1. The
optimal strategy of nance depends on the level of initial cash ow C relative to the rm-
specic investment opportunities. Assume for now a constant td between the two periods,
i.e. t0d = t
1
d = td.
A Regime 1: Financed by New Equity
When the marginal investment is nanced by issuing new shares, this implies that the di-
vidend payments are zero, i.e. D = 0 so that D > 0, and E > 0 so that E = 0: This
occurs when the initial cash ow C is so low relative to investment opportunities that, if the
rm issues the optimal level of new shares as suggested by the optimal condition, it cannot
nance the optimal level of investment and pay positive dividends in the current period. In
this case the rst-order conditions are
fI =
(1 + r)
(1  tc)

1 +
D
1  td

; (1)
and
fE =
(1 + r)
(1  tc)

1  D
1  td   1

: (2)
In this case, the foreign a¢ liate invests all the cash it has: I = C + E and nances the
marginal investment with new equity. Condition (2), which determines the amount of equity
injection, indicates that the repatriation tax also plays a role in this decision.
Implicit di¤erentiating of equation (1) and (2) suggests that @fI=@(1   td) < 0 and
@fE=@(1   td) < 0. A decrease in td implies for rms in this nancial regime a decrease
in the marginal cost of investment, and in turn an increase in the level of investment. A
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decrease in the dividend tax also implies a decrease in the marginal cost of issuing new
shares, which leads to an increase in the level of new shares issued by the parent company.
In addition, if the cross-derivative fI ;E is strictly positive, the increase in new shares issued
implies further increase in investment. The rm is considered as nancially constrained
in this regime, because a windfall increase in cash ow would reduce the shadow value of
internal funds D, thus increasing new share issues and invesmtent.
These results are from the standard old viewmodels that when marginal investments
are nanced by funds from outside investors, proceeds from these investments are returned
to investors and face the dividend tax rate (Poterba and Summers, 1984). An increase in
the dividend tax rate raises the e¤ective tax rate on investment income and discourages
investment, with potentially adverse welfare consequences. Conversely, reduction in the
dividend tax, as in the case of the 2009 dividend exemption, will potentially encourage
investment by UK multinationals in low tax countries.
B Regime 2: Financed by Retained Earnings
In the second regime, the initial cash ow C is su¢ ciently high relative to investment op-
portunities, so the marginal investment is nanced out of retained earnings. This implies
that D > 0 so that D = 0, and E = 0 so that E > 0. The rst-order condition (1) thus
becomes
fI = (1 + r) ; (3)
implying that the cost of capital and the optimal level of investment does not depend on the
dividend tax td. This is because provided the tax rate on dividends is constant, a dividend
tax lowers both the cost of investment and the return on the investment by the same amount,
and thus has no e¤ect on the cost of capital.
This condition reproduces results from new view, or trapped equityview of dividend
taxation, which is developed by King (1974), Auerbach (1979) and Hartman (1985), that
capital in the mature state does not depend on the dividend tax td.
Comparing equations 1 and 3 conrms that standard pecking order in which external
nance is not less expensive than internal nance. In the context of international direct
investment, the result implies that UK multinationals should nance their investment rst
by exhausting the internal funds before turning to requiring new capital injection from the
parent company. It is more tax e¢ cient for the foreign a¢ liate to retain the initial earnings
and avoid a tax on dividends.
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C Anticipation E¤ect of Changes in Dividend Taxes
The above results hold with a constant dividend tax. The irrelevance result of dividend
taxation for marginal investments relying on internal nance no longer applies when there
is some change in the rate of dividend tax, or there is expectation of such changes.
Suppose that the parent rm anticipates in period 0 that the rate of dividend tax will
decrease in the next period so that t0d > t
1
d. In this case, the rst-order condition that
determines the optimal level of investment for rms in the second nancial regime becomes
fI =

1  t0d
1  t1d

(1 + r) : (4)
Equation (4) suggests that when the dividend tax rate in period 0 is higher relative to its
level in the next period, the marginal cost of investment in period 0 for rms relying on
retained earnings is lower than (1 + r). The optimal investment level in period 0 would
be higher than the level determined by equation (3) in the absence of anticipating any tax
change, even when the marginal source of nance for new investment is retained earnings.
The intuition is straightforward. Anticipating a decrease in the dividend tax, dividend
payouts in period 1 becomes more attractive than in period 0. In consequence, the rm would
postpone all dividend payouts to the next period and use the retained earnings savings to
increase investment in period 0. In the context of the 2009 territoriality reform, the result
suggests that UK multinationals would postpone dividend repatriations until post-2009, and
would increase their investment in the years immediately before the reform. In the following
sections, I empirically examine the responsiveness of investment by UK multinational a¢ li-
ates to the introduction of the dividend exemption regime, which considerably decreased the
dividend tax rates in the low-tax countries.
IV Data
The primary dataset for empirical analysis is an unbalanced panel of 131,614 multinational
a¢ liates in one of the EU-27 countries for the years 2005 to 2011. It is constructed by using
unconsolidated nancial statements of multinational subsidiaries in the commercial Amadeus
database, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk.13 A company is dened as a multinational
subsidiary if it has an ultimate parent company owning at least 50% of its shares and is in
a di¤erent country than the parent company. The ultimate parent company in the dataset
13The Amadeus database includes approximately 8 million public and private companies in 38 European
countries. It combines data from over 35 specialist regional information providers and provides information
on nancial statement and basic ownership structure for medium and large-sized European companies.
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locates in one of 158 countries.
The main sample contains all multinational a¢ liates that: (a) reports non-missing, non-
zero turnover and total asset values, and (b) is not a nancial company with main productive
assets that are typically not tangible capital. I further discard any observation with missing
industry or unspecied home country information. Table 1 shows the country distribution
of multinational a¢ liates in the main sample.
The main accounting variables are ows of investment, sales, cash ow, and earnings
before interest and tax (EBIT).14 Investment spending (It) is computed as changes in xed
capital assets based on the net book values of tangible and intangible xed assets plus
depreciation, i.e. Kt+1  Kt + depreciation, where Kt denotes book value of the xed asset
in year t. Gross investment rate, Investmentt, is dened as the ratio between current-
year gross investment spending and beginning-of-year net xed capital asset. Similarly,
net investment rate, Investment_Nett, is dened as the ratio between current-year net
investment spending and beginning-of-year net xed capital asset. Sales refers to operating
revenue and prot margin is calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided
by sales. All ratio variables are winsorized at top and bottom 0.01 percentile to minimize
the inuence of outliers. Table 3 contains summary statistics for the main variables.
A limitation of the Amadeus data, however, is that information on the ownership struc-
ture refers to the last reported date, which is year 2011 for most observations in the sample.
I assume that the parent-a¢ liate ownership structure for 2011 applies to the earlier years
and there may be potential misclassication of parent-subsidiary-connections due to change
of ownership structure over the sample period.15 Suppose that UKs moving to an exemption
system increases the competitiveness of UK parent company in the international market. As
a result they acquire more foreign subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions.16 By including these
newly acquired subsidiaries in the analysis, the estimation results will capture the overall
investment response to dividend exemption by allowing for endogenous investment changes
at the extensive margin via merge and acquisition.
I merge data on the statutory corporate tax rate at the a¢ liate location provided by
Oxford Centre for Business Taxation Tax Database.17 This is a measure of total statutory
tax rate including top corporate tax rate at federal level, any surcharge levied, and any local
14Unfortunately, there is no information on dividend payment in the a¢ liate-level nancial statement
which would allow for a direct test of the e¤ect of dividend exemption on dividend repatriation.
15This caveat is acknowledged in previous studies exploring the ownership structure in the AMADEUS
data. See, e.g. Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005), Dischinger and Riedel (2011) and Dharmapala and
Riedel (2013).
16Feld et al. (2005) estimates that the abolishment of repatriation taxes in the UK in 2009 has increased
the number of acquisitions abroad by Bristish rms by 3.9%.
17Available at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/tax/publications/data
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corporate tax rate in a given country-year. Subsidiaries in the main sample face a statutory
corporate tax rate that ranges from 0.10 to 0.404 with a mean of 0.285.
To identify low-tax countries, I dene an indicator variable low tax which takes on value
1 if a country sets its corporate tax rate consistently below the UK rate in 2005-2011 and 0
otherwise. Table 2 lists the low and high tax countries and the corresponding tax rates.18 I
further merge data on host country characteristics including GDP per capita, population and
unemployment rate to capture the aggregate market size and demand characteristics, and
measures of governance quality and nancial stability in the host countries. Home-country
characteristics are also included to capture marcoeconomic conditions at the parent location.
These variables include the growth rate of GDP per capital, and indicators on governance
quality and nancial institution stability from theWorld Development Indicators Database.19
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables that are used for regression
analysis.
V Empirical Strategy
This section describes the empirical strategy designed to identify the causal e¤ect of dividend
exemption on investment by UK a¢ liates. Specically, I exploit plausibly exogenous time-
series variation in the relative cost of equity nancing following UKs switch to the exemption
system. If dividend exemption has decreased the tax burden of equity nancing faced by UK
a¢ liates in low-tax countries, we would expect an increase in investment by UK a¢ liates after
2009 if new equity is the main marginal source of nance. To explicitly control for variation
in the investment due to non-tax factors, I use a control group of non-UK multinational
a¢ liates in the same host country which are exposed to aggregate shocks similar to those
experienced by the UK a¢ liates. Formally, I examine investment by UK a¢ liates in the
standard di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DD) specication:
INV ESTMENTikt = ai + dt + DEDEt + xxikt + zzkt + "ikt; (5)
where i indexes rms, k indexes host countries, and t indexes time. The dependent variable
INV ESTMENTikt denotes gross investment scaled by book value of xed capital asset
18An alternative indicator of low tax is dened to be i if the corporate tax rate in the host country is lower
than the UK rate in 2008, the last year before the territorial reform. The group of low-tax countries dened
in this way are: XXX.
19Subsidiary-level country data is collected from the European Statistical O¢ ce (Eurostat), available
at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/. Parent-level country data is col-
lected from the World Development Indicators Database, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators.
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in (end of) year t   1. The key variable of interest, DEt, is an indicator equal to one
for UK a¢ liates starting in 2009, and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient DE represents the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate of the e¤ect of dividend exemption on investment by UK
a¢ liates. Following the theoretical discussions in Section III, I expect DE to be positive
and signicant if a non-trivial number of UK a¢ liates nance their marginal investment by
new equity.
A full set of rm xed e¤ects (ai) is included to control for unobserved rm-specic pro-
ductivity di¤erences and the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the parent com-
pany. Firm xed e¤ects further subsume host-country xed e¤ects (given that a¢ liates do
not change their location), which control for time-invariant di¤erences across host countries
that may a¤ect the location choice of multinationals, which include, for example, perceived
average quality of governance during the sample period, common language and/or former co-
lonial ties, and geographical distance between the home and host country. I further include
a full set of time dummies (dt) to capture the e¤ect of aggregate marcoeconomic shocks,
including the e¤ect of the great recession, that are common to all multinational a¢ liates in
the same host country. xikt denotes a possible empty vector of rm-level controls, and "ikt
is the error term.
Most specications include the statutory corporate tax rate at source to control for the
confounding e¤ects of concurrent tax reforms in the host countries, and a full set of industry
by year interactions and country by year interactions to control for industry and country
specic macro-economic factors that may a¤ect private investment and would otherwise be
captured by the DD estimates. In addition, I control for a set of time-varying country charac-
teristics (zkt) for both host and parent countries, including GDP per capita, population size,
unemployment rate, and indices of governance quality and nancial institution stability to
capture the e¤ect of time-varying local productivity, market size and demand characteristics
on investment.
As shown in Table A.1 panel A, there are fewer a¢ liates in the treated group, but they are
signicantly larger than the non-UK a¢ liates in the control group and are also more liquid
and protable. I employ two alternative approaches to address the concern that UK and
control a¢ liates may not be identical in terms of observable characteristics, and that these
di¤erences can explain di¤erent trends in investment over time. First, I directly control
for a set of variables that may capture rm-level investment opportunities (xikt), which
include lagged output, cash ow scaled by lagged asset, lagged prot margin as a measure
of protability, and one-period lagged growth rate of output. Alternatively, I implement a
matching DD strategy (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997)). To this end, I replicate the
DD tests on a subsample of matched rms based on pre-reform characteristics. As shown in
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Table A.1 panel B, the treated and control group in the matched sample are comparable in
terms of rm size and cash ow. The key assumption underlying the DD technique is that
investment trends in both the treated and control groups would be the same in the absence
of dividend exemption. I examine any di¤erences in the trends before the legislation in the
next section, both graphically and in a placebo regression test.
VI Investment Responses in Low-Tax Countries
A Graphical Evidence
Figure 2 shows the median investment by UK and non-UK a¢ liates around the dividend
exemption reform in the low tax countries (Panel A) and high tax countries (Panels B), which
reveal some distinct patterns in the two panels. In the low tax countries, the reduction in real
investment (relative to its 2006 level) of UK a¢ liates closely tracked that of non-UK a¢ liates
up to 2009, and both group started to increase their investment after the nancial crisis.
Comparing to their non-UK peers, UK a¢ liates increased their investment more after 2009,
which could potentially be attributed to the territoriality reform. In the high tax countries,
while investment of UK a¢ liates decreased more than that of non-UK a¢ liates since 2006,
changes in investment were quite similar in the years prior to 2009. The investment gap
widens in 2009 but was closed within two years as a result of rapid increase in investment
by UK a¢ liates in the high tax countries.
There are at least two threats to identication. The rst is that contemporaneous changes
that are unrelated to the tax reform, which could have di¤erential impacts on UK and
non-UK a¢ liates. For example, UK a¢ liates might be more resilient to the nancial crisis
comparing to their non-UK peers, which could explain the smaller decline in their investment.
This highlights the importance of controlling for time-invariant a¢ liate and parent company
characteristics in the regressions, as well as time-varying industry trends which absorbs the
di¤erential impact of nancial crisis at the industry level. Second, concurrent tax reforms
in other countries are likely to confound the e¤ect of dividend exemption that is of primary
interest in this paper. For example, Japan also changed to the territorial system in 2009.
Given a statutory corporate tax rate of 38% in Japan, the outbound investment of Japanese
multinationals may also increase the sample, resulting a downward bias in the estimated
e¤ect of dividend exemption for UK companies. This highlights the importance of focusing
on non-UK a¢ liates with headquarters in exemption system throughout the sample period.
To summarize, Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence on the e¤ect of dividend taxation
on UK outbound investment. In the following section, I use regression analysis to control for
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a large set of confounding factors and provide conclusive evidence of a link between dividend
taxation and outbound investment by UK multinationals.
B Baseline results
Table 4 presents regression results from the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation of equation (5),
focusing on multinational a¢ liates operating in the EU-27 countries with a lower corporate
tax rate compared to the UK. All regressions include a full set of rm xed e¤ects and year
xed e¤ects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the rm level
are show in brackets below the coe¢ cient estimates.
In column 1, the coe¢ cient estimate for DEt, which is the interaction between a UK
a¢ liate indicator and an indicator for years post 2009, is positive and highly signicant, sug-
gesting that dividend exemption has systematically increased investment undertaken by UK
a¢ liates in the low-tax countries. The empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical
prediction if a non-trivial portion of their marginal investment is nanced by new equity.
To assess the robustness of this nding, column 2 includes additional controls that capture
rm-specic investment opportunities, which include one-period lagged turnover, cash ow
scaled by lagged asset, lagged prot margin, and growth rate of lagged turnover. To con-
trol for the fact that the sector composition for UK a¢ liates may be di¤erent from that of
non-UK a¢ liates, column 3 adds industry by time xed e¤ects to control for time-varying
shocks to each industry at the 1-digit NACE level. The basic result remains unchanged.
To control for potential confounding e¤ects of concurrent host-country tax reforms on
investment, column 4 includes host-country statutory tax rate on corporate income. Column
4 also adds other host-country characteristics including GDP per capita, population size,
unemployment rate, and indicators of governance quality and nancial institution stability
to control for the impact of market condition that would otherwise be captured by the DEt
coe¢ cient estimate. To examine the robustness of the results to di¤erential country-specic
shocks, column 5 adds a full set of country by year interactions to control for all country
specic macro-economic factors that may a¤ect private investment. The empirical estimates
do not appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of this rich set of control variables.
While time-invariant parent company characteristics and time-invariant home country
characteristics are already controlled for with a¢ liate xed e¤ects, it is possible that the
parent companies of UK a¢ liates were exposed to di¤erent shocks at home. To control for
these e¤ects column 6 adds additional time-variant marcoeconomic characteristics of the
home country including GDP growth rate, GDP per capita and indicators on governance
quality and nancial stability. The baseline results remain unchanged. Column 7 replaces
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the DEt variable with its interaction with the decrease in dividend taxes in each of the low-
tax countries to capture the magnitude of the tax reform. The coe¢ cient estimate of the
post-reform tax di¤erential is around 1.59 and highly signicant, suggesting that for every
one percentage point decrease in the dividend tax rate, there is a 1.59 percentage point
increase in real investment per euro of xed assets by UK a¢ liates in the low-tax countries.
Finally, columns 8 and 9 restrict the treated group to be UK a¢ liates in a company group
which also has an a¢ liate in the high-tax countries, and the estimated e¤ect of the tax
reform slightly increases in this subsample.
C Robustness Checks
In this section, I assess whether the ndings are robust to a number of alternative specica-
tions and samples. First, columns 1-4 of Table 5 use the same specication, control variables,
and scaling underlying column 6 of Table 4, except that in column 1 the standard errors
are clustered by host-home country pair. This is to address the common concern that in
tax reform studies, the standard errors are understated by assuming independence across
rms within the same tax jurisdiction (Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan, 2004). Column
2 excludes non-UK a¢ liates in the control group with parent companies based in countries
with a worldwide system. To the extent that investment decisions by these rms may also
be inuenced by tax planning consideration under the worldwide system, they may be less
comparable to rms under the exemption system. To control for the potential confounding
e¤ect of eurozone crisis on investment, column 3 adds an interaction term between an indic-
ator that takes value of 1 for host countries in the eurozone and the post-2009 indicator and
identies the impact of the 2009 reform independent of the exchange rate crisis. To ensure
that the identied tax e¤ect is not entirely driven by rm entries and exits, column 4 uses
a balanced sample that include rms that are established before 2005 and survived through
2010. The resulting DEt coe¢ cient estimates from the four regressions are statistically
indistinguishable from the main estimate reported in Table 4 column 6.
Column 5 implements a matching DD strategy (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997)) to
address the concern that companies in the treated UK and control a¢ liates may not have
similar observable characteristics, and that these di¤erences may explain di¤erent trends in
investment over time. The regression in column 5 replicates the DD analysis on a subsample
of matched rms from a Mahalanobis distance matching procedure based on pre-reform rm-
level characteristics in terms of turnover, turnover growth, operating prots, and number
of employees. The matching DD analysis further controls time-varying industry shocks
and host-country marcoeconomic conditions. The resulting estimate has a wider condence
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interval given the smaller number of observations but remains positive and signicant at the
10 percent level.
Finally, to ensure that the identied tax e¤ect is not driven by any outliers in the outcome
variables, column 6 in the upper panel uses gross investment rate winsorized at 97.5 percentile
as the dependent variable, while columns 1-2 in the lower panel use net investment rate
winsorized at 99 and 97.5 percentile as the dependent variable, respectively. The estimated
e¤ect of the tax reform remains positive and signicant, and is not signicantly di¤erent
from the estimate from the preferred specication in Table 4 column 6.
D Heterogeneous Analysis
To investigate the potential heterogeneity in investment responses by UK a¢ liates, I use
several proxies for ex ante nancial constraints including rm size, liquid asset position
and protability to test for a di¤erence in investment responses between constrained and
unconstrained rms. If the nancing of multinational a¢ liates represents an important
consideration for investment as suggested in Section III, we should expect to nd a consistent,
systematic di¤erence in investment responses for groups of rms based on these proxies. The
proxies are dened based on the pre-2009 rm-level average characteristics, excluding rms
that recently entered or did not survive throughout 2010. Firms in the main sample are
divided into each of the deciles for each indicator. I then estimate the e¤ect of the tax reform
by interacting the DEt and each of the ten decile indicators in the following specication:
INV ESTMENTikt = ai+dt+
10X
j=1
DE;DecilejDEtIfi 2 Decilejg+xxikt+zzkt+"ikt; (6)
where Ifi 2 Decilejg is the jth decile indicator dened above, and all other variables are
previously dened. The coe¢ cient DE;Decilej represents the quantity of interest: the e¤ect
of the 2009 dividends exemption on investment by UK a¢ liates relative to non-UK a¢ liates
in the jth decile of the distribution of the relevant nancial constraints indicator.
Panels A of Figure 3 reports the coe¢ cient estimates DE and the 90% condence interval
across deciles of pre-2009 rm size. It shows that only large UK-owned a¢ liates in the upper
deciles of the turnover distribution signicantly increased their investment in response to the
2009 reform. A similar pattern is shown in panel B which examines heterogenous investment
responses based on the distribution of total asset. Following theoretical discussions in Section
III, only investment by rms relying on new equity from the parent company would respond
to the territoriality reform. Panels C of Figure 3 reports the results based on the distribution
of free cash ow. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction and shows a higher
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sensitivity of investment in the cash-poor sample. There is no increase in investment by rms
in the lowest decile of the cash ow distribution, possibly because these are poorly-performing
rms. The investment increase is predominately concentrated in the 2nd-7th decile of the
cash ow distribution, as supported by the hypothesis test that the coe¢ cient estimates of
DE;Decile2 to DE;Decile7 are jointly signicantly di¤erent from zero (p value=0.000), while
the coe¢ cient estimates of DE;Decile8 to DE;Decile10 are jointly indistinguishable from zero
(p value=0.639).
Panel D of Figure 3 reports the results based on the distribution of protability. The
investment increase is mainly in rms in the 4th-8th deciles distribution of protability.20 The
results suggest that rms with extremely low protability did not increase their investment
in response to the tax reform, neither did extremely protable rms which are more likely
to rely on retained earnings to nance their investment.
The theoretical discussion in section III also implies that increase in investment by UK
a¢ liates should be mainly driven by new capital from the parent company. Evidence consist-
ent with this hypothesis would be a more prominent investment response for rms in larger
and more liquid company groups.21 Panel E reports the results based on the distribution of
the company group sizethe number of related companies in the same company groupand
the results suggest a higher sensitivity of investment in larger multinational group. Finally,
panel F reports the results based on the distribution of the company group asset. The
measure is constructed by summing up the total asset of all a¢ liates with the same parent
company in the main sample.22 The results are roughly consistent that there is a higher
sensitivity of investment in large MNCs measured by the total asset of the company group.
E Timing of the Investment Responses
Consultation on the UKs moving to an exemption system was launched in late 2007, but the
draft legislation was not released until more than a year later in February 2009.23 Within
two months, the Financial Bill 2009 formally introduced the exemption system which took
20The p value from the joint test under the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient estimates of DE;Decile4 to
DE;Decile8 are jointly zero is 0.0001. Similarly, the p value from the joint test under the null hypoethesis
that the coe¢ cient estimates of DE;Decile1 to DE;Decile3 and DE;Decile9 to DE;Decile10 are jointly zero
is 0.765 and 0.252, respectively.
21In theory, the parent company can either inject equity with internal funds, or raise equity from external
capital market.
22Note that as Amadeus only includes European a¢ liates, the group asset variable is a noisy measure of
the worldwide company group asset.
23At the time of release, HMRC emphasized that the draft legislation was at an earlier stage of development
than normal and signicant changes should be anticipated. There was no date specied as to when the new
legislation would take e¤ect.
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e¤ect on July 1, 2009.24 Despite a narrow three-month window between the announcement
and implementation of the exemption system, UK multinationals may nevertheless have
anticipated in 2008 the coming reduction in dividend taxation. Depending on the marginal
source of nance, investment of UK-owned a¢ liates would respond in opposite directions.
If new equity injected from the UK parent is the marginal source of nance, a forward-
looking prot maximizing UK a¢ liate would delay some investment spending in low-tax
countries in anticipation of a dividend tax cut until after the implementation of the policy.
In this case, there would be a temporary decrease in investment by UK a¢ liates in the low
tax countries in 2008 and then an overshoot in investment in 2009, and the di¤erence-in-
di¤erence coe¢ cient estimate could reect strategically timing of investment spending rather
than a genuine increase in investment spending.
For UK a¢ liates that rely on internal nancing, equation (4) shows that the cost of
capital becomes cheaper in 2008 given a forthcoming reduction in the tax rate. A forward-
looking prot maximizing UK a¢ liate would increase some investment spending in the low-
tax countries in 2008 prior to the tax reform, resulting a downward bias in the DD estimate.
To identify the e¤ect of anticipation on investment, I include in equation (5) another inter-
action term between a Y ear2008 dummy and an indicator for an UK a¢ liate:
INV ESTMENTikt = ai + dt + 2008Y ear2008t  UKMNCi + 1DEt + xxikt + zzkt + "ikt;
where all other variables are as previously dened. The 2008 coe¢ cient captures any di¤er-
ential change between investment by UK and non-UK a¢ liates in 2008, relative to the 2006
base-year level.
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results in low-tax countries. Regressions in columns 1
use gross investment as the dependent variable and follow the most comprehensive specica-
tion which includes additional controls at rm, host country and home country levels. While
the DEt coe¢ cient remains positive and highly signicant, the coe¢ cient estimate of 2008
is statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting the lack of evidence that UK a¢ liates
strategically adjusted their investment prior to the introduction of dividend exemption.25
24It is a 100% exemption rule for most dividends payable on or after 1 July 2009, including prots accu-
mulated before the introduction of the new legistlation.
25Timing uncertainty associated with the dividend exemption reform may provide an alternative explan-
ation to the lack of any anticipation e¤ects. There are two components of reform proposed in the 2007
consultation: exemption of foreign-sourced income and a new Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) regime.
By 2008, however, implementation of the proposal was already in jeopardy. This is due to HMRCs re-
quirement that the dividend proposals must be tax neutral, which required targeted measures to restrict
the tax deductibility of interest and to use the CFC regime to generate additional tax revenues by including
certain capital gains and income from intellectual property (IP). The proposed CFC regime has attracted
wide criticism particularly from IP-rich companies and has led to a number of UK headquartered multina-
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To further examine how quickly outbound investment reacted to dividend exemption,
the regression in table 6 column 2 include two additional interaction terms between a post
2010/2011 year dummy and an indicator for a UK a¢ liate, respectively. Coe¢ cient on
each interaction term would capture the di¤erential change between investment by UK and
non-UK a¢ liates following the corresponding year, conditioned on any changes that already
occurred in 2009. The estimate coe¢ cient of DEt remains positive and highly signicant,
while the DD coe¢ cient in 2010 is also positive and signicant at the 10 percent level. The
results suggest that UK a¢ liates respond to dividend exemption by immediately increasing
their current investment. Column 3 and 4 in Table 6 repeat the analysis using net investment
as the dependent variable, and the results remain qualitatively the same.
Finally, I conduct simply placebo tests to see whether the investment by UK a¢ liates
increased in 2007 or 2008 prior to the tax reform, by replacing the DEt variable with an
interaction term between a post 2007/2008 dummy indicator and an indicator for a UK
a¢ liate, respectively. Figure 4 summarizes the coe¢ cient estimates of the interaction terms.
None of the coe¢ cient estimates are signicantly di¤erent from zero, except the one for the
DEt variable. The results are assuring that the identied e¤ect of the 2009 tax reform is not a
simple continuation of pre-reform increase in the outbound investment of UK multinationals.
F The E¤ect of Dividend Exemption on Other Outcomes
According to discussions in Section III, increases in investment following a dividend tax cut
are nanced out of new equity. Therefore some increases in the level of new equity issued to
the UK a¢ liates would be consistent with the observed investment increases in the low-tax
countries. Since there is no information on the amount of new equity in the data, I impute
the amount of paid-in capital as the di¤erence between shareholder funds and after-tax prot.
This is a noisy measure of paid-in capital, as it also include other accumulated comprehensive
income or loss as part of the shareholdersfund. The amount of additional paid-in capital or
new equity, is computed as changes in the paid-capital between two consecutive years. To
reduce the amount of measurement errors in the new equity variable, I construct a dummy
indicator that takes value of 1 if the imputed new equity is positive, and zero otherwise. I
tionals (such as Shire Pharmaceuticals and United Business Media) announcing their intention to relocate
to a more tax friendly jurisdiction, such as Ireland. In view of these criticisms and a potentially signicant
number of companies seeking to leave the UK, HMRC announced that it would postpone the new CFC
regime and instead, tighten up the existing rules. HMRC also announced its intention to move forward with
the dividend exemption, but only if suitable measures to protect UK tax revenues could be found. It was
therefore unclear in 2008, in retrospect, the exact time when the dividend exemption would come into e¤ect.
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then run a binary discrete choice model of the following form:
NewEquityit = ai+dt+DEDEt+DE;Cash poorDEtIfi 2 Cash Poorg+xxikt+zzkt+"ikt;
(7)
where NewEquityit represents the binary variable of receiving new equity, Ifi 2 Cash Poorg
is an indicator that takes value of 1 for all subsidiaries in the 2nd-7th decile of the cash ow
distribution, and all other variables are as previously dened. As identied in section D, the
investment increases are concentrated in the subsample of UK a¢ liates in the 2nd-7th decile
of the cash ow distribution. The regression results from a xed-e¤ect linear probability
model suggest that the tax reform signicantly increases the probability of getting additional
paid-in capital for the cash-poor UK a¢ liates by around 6 percent (bDE;Cash poor =  0:060
with a robust standard error of 0:036), while there is no signicant change in the probability
of getting new equity for the cash-rich UK a¢ liates (bDE =  0:024 with a standard error of
0:028).
Columns 3-6 in Panel B of Table 5 further examine the e¤ect of dividend exemption on
other outcome variables including rm-level wage rate, employment, labor productivity, and
protability. Wage rate is the only variable that shows a signicant change to the tax reform,
conditioning on the investment increase. As there is no signicant change in the variables
measuring labor productivity or protability, the increase in wage rate could be interpreted
as evidence on rent sharing. In circumstances where dividend taxes are e¤ectively paid by
the foreign a¢ liates, the tax reform increases the total after-tax prot and the share of prots
that goes to workers in the form of compensation.
VII Reallocation or Increase in Total Investment?
The observed increase in investment by UK multinationals in the low-tax countries could
represent an increase in the aggregate investment by UK multinationals due to the reduction
in the cost of capital. Alternatively, the investment increase may reect a reallocation of
investment from high-tax to low-tax countries with no impact on aggregate invesmtent. This
concern is particularly relevant around the time of the great recession, when many companies
are resource constrained with limited investment capacity. Alternatively, if UK multination-
als use high-tax a¢ liates as a vehicle to lower taxes on repatriations, the territoriality reform
may decrease the value of high-tax investment. To test these two competing hypothesis, I
analyze investment by UK multinationals in the high-tax countries as well as in the UK.
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A Outbound Investment Responses in High-Tax Countries
Table 7 presents the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation results based on equation (5), focusing
on multinational a¢ liates operating in the EU-27 high-tax countries. Similar to Table 4, all
regressions include a full set of subsidiary and year xed e¤ects. Each column follows the
same specication in Table 4. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the rm
level.
Column 1 in Table 7 shows that the introduction of dividend exemption has a somewhat
negative e¤ect on investment by UK a¢ liates in the high-tax countries, which could be
suggestive that the UK multinationals invested strategically in the high-tax countries to
utilize cross crediting to minimize their foreign tax liability. However the negative e¤ect
becomes statistically insignicant once controlling for other non-tax rm-level determinants
of investment in column 2, and remains imprecisely estimated in columns 3-7 that control
for additional industry, host and home country characteristics. Since the introduction of
the territorial system did not directly change the tax treatment of dividend repatriation in
the high-tax countries, the lack of investment response in high-tax countries suggests that
there is limited shifting of overseas activities from high to low-tax countries following the
tax reform. Similarly, I do not nd any signicant changes in other outcome variables in
response to the introduction of the territorial system, as shown in Table 8.
B Domestic Response to Dividends Exemption
To analyze the investment response of UK-owned multinational a¢ liates at home, I use a
similar DD strategy with two alternative control groups: (1) non-UK multinational a¢ liates
operating in the UK, and (2) UK a¢ liates that are part of a domestic company group.26
Table 9 summarizes the regression results using non-UK multinational a¢ liates/domestic
rms as the control group in panel A and B, respectively.27 Columns 1-4 follow the same re-
gression specication as in Table 4, while columns 5-6 attempt to identify the presence of any
anticipation e¤ects in 2008. In Panel A, the coe¢ cient estimate of DEt is mostly negative
and insignicant, suggesting that there is no di¤erential investment response by UK-owned
a¢ liates relative to foreign a¢ liates in non-UK MNEs. In Panel B, the coe¢ cient estimate
of DEt is statistically insignicant across all specications, suggesting that there is no di¤er-
ential investment response by UK-owned a¢ liates relative to a¢ liates in domestic company
groups. Regression results in both panels provide suggestive evidence that the exemption
system did not systematically a¤ect domestic investment by UK a¢ liates. Conceptually,
26I identify stand-alone rms and domestic company group with all subsidiaries in the UK from ownership
information on all UK companies in FAME.
27The graphical evidence is presented in Figure in the Appendix.
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there is no reason why we would expect such investment change at home, as the tax reform
did not change the after-tax rate of return in the UK.
This nding is consistent with Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (2011), which shows that
repatriation following a 2004 tax holiday introduced by the Homeland Investment Act (HIA)
did not increase domestic investment in the United States.28 To reconcile with Egger et al.
(2015), which nds that the territorial system induced UK a¢ liates to pay out signicantly
more dividends immediately after the reform, the lack of investment response at home may
suggest that repatriations could be used to increase employment, pay o¤ debt, or return to
shareholders. Unfortunately, further investigation on the impact of dividend exemption on
UK multinational groups requires additional data from consolidated nancial statement at
the company group level. I leave this exercise to further research. At the same time, the
lack of investment response at home provides further supportive evidence that outbound
investment in low-tax countries did not increase at the expense of domestic investment.
VIII Discussions
To gauge the quantitative impact of the 2009 reform on outbound investment of UK multina-
tionals in low-tax countries, I calculate the increase in investment at the rm and country
level. First, the pre-reform average xed asset in the UK a¢ liates across low-tax countries is
around e16.31 million. Given a DD coe¢ cient estimate of 0.157, it implies that the average
investment increase in the UK a¢ liates is around e0.82 million (in real 2006 terms). Second,
I estimate the increase in aggregate investment by summing all the rm-level investment in-
crease in each country.29 The country-level investment increase is shown in Figure 5. In
aggregate, the predicted investment increase is around e5.6 billion (in real 2006 terms) in
the low-tax countries, where Ireland, Czech Republic and Poland see the largest increase in
their foreign direct investment as a result of the UK tax reform. The aggregate investment
increase in the low tax countries is approximately 9 times the amount of estimated foregone
tax revenue, suggesting that the tax reform has a strong bang for the buck e¤ect by stimu-
lating £ 9 of foreign investment by UK multinationals in the low-tax countries for every £ 1
28Two major di¤erences are worth noting. First, the HIA provides U.S. multinationals with a one-time
deduction of 85 percent of dividends repatriated by their foreign a¢ liates. In contrary, UKs dividend
exemption is permanent. Second, under the HIA, the 85 percent exemption applies only to extraordinary
dividends, which are dened as dividend payments exceeding average repatriations over a ve-year period
ending before July 1, 2003, excluding the highest and lowest years. Thus the exemption is limited to
extraordinary dividends over and above the average level of dividends remitted. The UKs exemption applies
to most dividends as discussed in Section B. The exemption permitted under the new system in the UK is
di¤erent in nature and more generous than the exemption under the HIA in the United States.
29Specically, for each rm the investment increase is computed as the average pre-2009 xed asset times
the estimated tax di¤erential coe¢ cient and the country-level reduction in the dividend tax rate
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loss in tax revenue at home.
IX Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the causal e¤ect of corporation tax in the home country on outward
direct investment of multinationals in a quasi-experiment setting. Specically, I exploit
di¤erential changes in dividend taxes on foreign earnings of UK multinational a¢ liates,
following UKs change from the worldwide to territorial tax system in 2009. By exempting
foreign earnings from dividend taxation, this reform lowered the after-tax cost of capital for
investment by UK a¢ liates in countries with a lower statutory corporate tax rate compared
to the UK.
The ndings provide robust evidence that home-country taxes on foreign-source income
exert a strong e¤ect on the level and location of foreign investment. UK a¢ liates on average
have increased their investment into the low tax countries by 16 percent, implying an elasti-
city estimate of investment with respect to repatriation taxes of around 0.2. The results
shed light on the debate on whether the United States should implement the territorial tax
system by showing that there is no evidence that the investment increase in the low tax
countries leads to reallocation of foreign direct investment from the high tax countries or
results any signicant investment distortion or loss at home.
The ndings that UK multinationals increased more investment into countries with a
lower corporation tax bear further implication on the corporation tax policy of small capital-
importing countries. In particular, the immediate investment responses of the UK multina-
tionals after the reform suggests that the trend to shift from worldwide to territorial taxation
in major capital-exporting countries may put downward pressure on corporate tax rates in
small countries that compete with each other to attract inward foreign direct investment.
Consistent with these ndings, Matheson, Perry and Veung (2014) also nds that the bilat-
eral UK FDI nanced from new equity has become more sensitive to host-country statutory
tax rate following the UKs move to territoriality.
Corporate investment is not the only behavioral margin through which the UK mul-
tinationals respond to the territorial tax system. By exempting foreign-source income from
taxation at home, the reform may cost considerable revenue by encouraging prot shifting
to abroad. If this is the case, it is important to consider proper anti-avoidance measures to
protect the tax base at home. Preliminary ndings from the current analysis suggest that
the territorial reform did not lead to a systematic increase in the reported protability of
UK a¢ liates in the low-tax countries. Nor is there any systematic increase in the reported
leverage ratio of UK a¢ liates in the high-tax countries. The average response may mask
25
important heterogeneity of behavioral responses at the rm level, and there are a number
of alternative channels for multinationals to shift prot. I plan to analyze the e¤ect of the
territorial reform on the extent of base erosion and prot shifting, and to provide a more
comprehensive welfare analysis of the territorial reform in future research.
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Figure 1. THE EFFECT OF DIVIDEND TAX CUT IN TWO FINANCIAL REGIMES
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Notes: This gure depicts the two nancial regimes under which a reduction in the dividend
tax rate would have di¤erent e¤ects on investment. In Regime 1, a multinational a¢ liate
with a marginal productivity of type B (MPB) nances its marginal investment out of
new equity. Following a decrease in the dividend tax rate from t0d to t
1
d, it would increase its
optimal investment level from IB to IB
0
. In Regime 2, a multinational a¢ liate has a marginal
productivity of type A (MPA) and nances its marginal investment out of retained earnings.
Its cost of capital is 1   r under a constant dividend tax but decreases to

1 t0d
1 t1d

(1   r)
when there is a temporary change in the rate of dividend tax, or there is expectation of such
changes. Anticipating a decrease in the dividend tax rate, rms in nancial regime 2 would
also increase their investment in the current period.
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Figure 2. GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE
A. Gross Investment Rate in Low-Tax Countries
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B. Gross Investment Rate in High-Tax Countries
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Notes: Panel A plots the median investment rate in 2006-2011 for UK and non-UK multina-
tional a¢ liates in low-tax countries. Panel B plots the median investment rate in 2006-2011
for UK a¢ liates and non-UK a¢ liates in high-tax countries. The solid vertical line depicts
the reform year when the territorial tax system was enacted, and the dashed vertical line
depicts the year when the policy reform was announced.
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Figure 3. HETEROGENEOUS INVESTMENT RESPONSES IN LOW-TAX COUNTRIES
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Notes: This gure reports regression results by dividing the main sample into deciles of ex
ante nancial constraints indicators based on rm size, total asset, cash ow (as a fraction
of lagged xed asset), and protability. The DD estimation now includes ten interaction
terms between the DEt and each of the ten decile dummy indicators. All other variables are
as previously dened. Each panel reports the ten coe¢ cient estimates DE;Decilej and the
corresponding 90th condence interval.
33
Figure 4. INVESTMENT RESPONSES IN LOW-TAX COUNTRIES: TIMING
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Notes: This gure reports the regression results from varying the papers main investment
regression specication (underlying Table 3 column 6) in order to conduct placebo tests.
For each year y between 2007 and 2009, the gure reports the coe¢ cient estimate for the
interaction term between a post year-y indicator and an indicator that takes value of 1 for
UK-owned a¢ liates, and the corresponding 95th condence interval.
Figure 5. PREDICTED INVESTMENT INCREASES IN LOW-TAX COUNTRIES
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Notes: This gure reports the predicted investment increase in the low-tax countries, using
coe¢ cient estimates in Table 3 column 7 and the actual decrease in dividend tax in each
country following the UKs change from the worldwide to territorial tax system.
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Table 2. LOW AND HIGH TAX COUNTRIES IN EU27
Country 2005 2011 Country 2005 2011
Low-Tax: High-Tax:
Cyprus 10 10 Portugal 29 29
Ireland 12.5 12.5 Austria 30 25
Bulgaria 15 10 Luxemburg 30.38 28.8
Latvia 15 15 Netherlands 31.5 25
Romania 16 16 Greece 32 24
Hungary 17.52 21 Belgium 33.99 33.99
Poland 19 19 France 34.93 34.93
Slovakia 19 19 Malta 35 35
Estonia 24 21 Italy 37.25 31.29
Slovenia 25 25 Germany 39.6 30.95
Finland 26 26 Spain 40.37 35.25
Czech Republic 26 19
Denmark 28 25
Sweden 28 25 UK 30 28
Notes: Low-tax countries refer to those with corporate tax rates consistently
lower than the UK tax rate during 2005-2011, and high-tax countries refer to
the rest of EU-27 countries.
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Table 6. SEPARATING THE ANTICIPATION EFFECT
Dependent var: Gross Investment Net Investment
(£ per lagged capital)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y ear2008 * UK A¢ liate 0.003 0.094 0.092 0.004 0.077 0.076
(0.089) (0.098) (0.098) (0.065) (0.081) (0.081)
DEt 0.157** 0.216** 0.147*** 0.190**
(0.074) (0.090) (0.056) (0.074)
Y ear2009 * UK A¢ liate 0.259*** 0.214***
(0.094) (0.077)
Y ear2010 * UK A¢ liate 0.166* 0.161**
(0.100) (0.082)
Y ear2011 * UK A¢ liate 0.207 0.187
(0.140) (0.122)
Year FEs x x x x x x
A¢ liate FEs x x x x x x
A¢ liate-Level Controls x x x x
Industry-Year Fes x x x x
Host Country-Level Controls x x x x
Parent Country-Level Controls x x x x
Host Country-Year FEs x x x x
N 73,014 73,014 73,014 73,689 73,689 73,689
Clusters (rms) 23,075 23,075 23,075 23,286 23,286 23,286
R2 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.017
Notes: This table reports di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the e¤ect of the 2009 dividends
exemption on UK outbound investment in low-tax countries. Columns 1-3 report results
using the gross investment rate as the dependent variable, and Columns 4-6 report results
using the net investment rate as the dependent variable. All columns display the coe¢ cient
on the interaction between a UK a¢ liate indicator and an indicator for the year 2008 when
the reform was announced. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 display the coe¢ cient on the DE variable,
which is the interaction between a UK a¢ liate indicator and an indicator for the year being
2009 onwards. Column 3 and 6 display the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between a
UK a¢ liate indicator and a year indicator for 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively.
40
T
ab
le
7.
IN
V
E
ST
M
E
N
T
R
E
SP
O
N
SE
IN
H
IG
H
-T
A
X
C
O
U
N
T
R
IE
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
D
E
t
-0
.0
71
*
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
10
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
44
)
T
ax
D
i¤
er
en
ia
l

D
E
t
-0
.3
04
(0
.7
51
)
Y
ea
r
F
E
s
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
A
¢
lia
te
F
E
s
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
A
¢
lia
te
-L
ev
el
C
on
tr
ol
s
x
x
x
x
x
x
In
du
st
ry
-Y
ea
r
Fe
s
x
x
x
x
x
H
os
t
C
ou
nt
ry
-L
ev
el
C
on
tr
ol
s
x
x
x
x
P
ar
en
t
C
ou
nt
ry
-L
ev
el
C
on
tr
ol
s
x
x
x
H
os
t
C
ou
nt
ry
-Y
ea
r
F
E
s
x
x
N
17
6,
67
8
13
0,
34
1
13
0,
34
1
13
0,
34
1
13
0,
34
1
12
8,
33
0
12
8,
33
0
C
lu
st
er
s
(
rm
s)
42
,6
66
37
,5
50
37
,5
50
37
,5
50
37
,5
50
36
,9
48
36
,9
48
R
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
N
ot
es
:
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
di
¤e
re
nc
e-
in
-d
i¤
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
at
es
of
th
e
e¤
ec
t
of
th
e
20
09
di
vi
de
nd
s
ex
em
pt
io
n
on
in
ve
st
m
en
t
by
U
K
a¢
lia
te
s
in
E
U
-2
7
co
un
tr
ie
s
w
hi
ch
ta
x
co
rp
or
at
e
pr
o
t
at
a
hi
gh
er
ra
te
th
an
th
e
U
K
.
A
ll
co
lu
m
ns
di
sp
la
y
th
e
co
e¢
ci
en
t
on
th
e
D
E
t
va
ri
ab
le
,w
hi
ch
is
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
be
tw
ee
n
a
U
K
a¢
lia
te
in
di
ca
to
r
an
d
an
in
di
ca
to
r
fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
be
in
g
20
09
on
w
ar
ds
,f
ro
m
a
re
gr
es
si
on
of
in
ve
st
m
en
t
ra
te
on
th
is
in
te
ra
ct
io
n,
a¢
lia
te
x
ed
e¤
ec
ts
,y
ea
r
x
ed
e¤
ec
ts
an
d
ad
di
ti
on
al
co
nt
ro
ls
.
In
ve
st
m
en
t
ra
te
is
gr
os
s
in
ve
st
m
en
t
sc
al
ed
by
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
x
ed
ca
pi
ta
l
as
se
t
in
(e
nd
of
)
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
.
A
¢
la
te
-L
ev
el
co
nt
ro
ls
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
in
cl
ud
es
la
gg
ed
tu
rn
ov
er
,
ca
sh
o
w
sc
al
ed
by
la
gg
ed
as
se
t,
la
gg
ed
pr
o
t
m
ar
gi
n,
an
d
r
m
ag
e.
A
ll
r
m
-l
ev
el
ra
ti
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
to
p
an
d
bo
tt
om
0.
25
th
pe
rc
en
ti
le
to
re
m
ov
e
th
e
in
u
en
ce
of
ou
tl
ie
rs
.
H
os
t
C
ou
nt
ry
-L
ev
el
co
nt
ro
l
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
in
cl
ud
es
st
at
ut
or
y
co
rp
or
at
e
ta
x
ra
te
,
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,
po
pu
la
ti
on
si
ze
,
an
d
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
at
th
e
ho
st
co
un
tr
y
le
ve
l.
H
os
t
C
ou
nt
ry
-Y
ea
r
F
E
s
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
in
cl
ud
es
tw
o-
w
ay
ho
st
co
un
tr
y
an
d
ye
ar
x
ed
e¤
ec
ts
.
P
ar
en
t
C
ou
nt
ry
-L
ev
el
co
nt
ro
ls

in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
in
cl
ud
es
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
ra
te
an
d
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
l
at
th
e
pa
re
nt
co
un
tr
y
le
ve
l.
H
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
it
y-
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
r
m
le
ve
l.
**
*,
**
,
*
de
no
te
s
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
1%
,
5%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
41
T
ab
le
8.
O
T
H
E
R
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
R
E
SP
O
N
SE
S
IN
H
IG
H
-T
A
X
C
O
U
N
T
R
IE
S
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
:
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
P
ro
du
ct
iv
it
y
P
ro
t
ab
ili
ty
T
ot
al
L
ev
er
ag
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
D
E
t
-9
.1
77
-9
.1
81
5.
23
8
5.
24
2
-1
.9
84
-1
.7
08
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
9*
0.
00
9*
(6
.0
13
)
(6
.0
12
)
(5
.8
99
)
(5
.8
99
)
(1
4.
65
6)
(1
4.
66
3)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
N
um
be
r
of
w
or
ke
rs
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
T
ur
no
ve
r
(t
ho
us
E
ur
o)
0.
02
4
0.
02
3
0.
11
7*
**
0.
11
5*
**
0.
00
0*
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
00
)
T
ot
al
A
ss
et
s
(t
ho
us
E
ur
o)
0.
00
5
0.
00
4
0.
06
9*
*
-0
.0
00
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
00
)
Y
ea
r
F
E
s
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
A
¢
lia
te
F
E
s
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
N
15
8,
26
6
15
8,
26
6
21
1,
42
0
21
1,
42
0
18
7,
06
7
18
7,
06
7
24
5,
88
9
24
5,
88
9
25
4,
12
1
25
4,
12
1
C
lu
st
er
s
(
rm
s)
37
,7
01
37
,7
01
44
,3
54
44
,3
54
43
,2
50
43
,2
50
49
,1
31
49
,1
31
52
,7
92
52
,7
92
R
2
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0
0
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
N
ot
es
:
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
di
¤e
re
nc
e-
in
-d
i¤
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
at
es
of
th
e
e¤
ec
t
of
th
e
20
09
di
vi
de
nd
s
ex
em
pt
io
n
on
ot
he
r
ou
tc
om
es
in
th
e
hi
gh
ta
x
co
un
tr
ie
s.
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
co
m
pa
ny
w
ag
e
an
d
sa
la
ry
pe
r
w
or
ke
r,
pr
od
uc
ti
vi
ty
is
th
e
to
ta
l
ou
tp
ut
pe
r
w
or
ke
r,
pr
o
ta
bi
lit
y
is
th
e
E
B
IT
re
la
ti
ve
to
to
ta
l
ou
tp
ut
,
an
d
to
ta
l
le
ve
ra
ge
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
to
ta
l
lia
bi
lit
y
re
la
ti
ve
to
to
ta
l
as
se
t.
A
ll
ot
he
r
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
as
pr
ev
io
us
ly
de
n
ed
in
T
ab
le
4.
H
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
it
y-
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
r
m
le
ve
l.
**
*,
**
,
*
de
no
te
s
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
1%
,
5%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
42
Table 9. INVESTMENT RESPONSE IN THE UK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Control Group: Non-UK MNE A­ iates
DEt -0.059 -0.038 -0.023 -0.017 -0.020 0.037
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.054) (0.076) (0.083)
Y ear2008 * UK Parent -0.003 -0.006
(0.074) (0.074)
Post2010 * UK Parent -0.109*
(0.065)
Post2011 * UK Parent 0.006
(0.086)
N 68,679 51,474 51,474 49,863 49,863 49,863
Clusters (rms) 16,535 14,702 14,702 14,208 14,208 14,208
R2 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
B. Control Group: UK Domestic Group A¢ liates
DEt -0.029 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.010 0.058
(0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.063) (0.073)
Y ear2008 * UK Parent 0.019 0.019
(0.072) (0.072)
Post2010 * UK Parent -0.096
(0.068)
Post2011 * UK Parent 0.042
(0.083)
N 38,253 27,875 27,875 27,875 27,875 27,875
Clusters (rms) 9,841 8,358 8,358 8,358 8,358 8,358
R2 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Notes: This table reports di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the e¤ect of the 2009 dividends
exemption on investment by UK a¢ liates in the UK. All columns display the coe¢ cient on the
DEt variable, which is the interaction between a UK a¢ liate indicator and an indicator for the year
being 2009 onwards, from a regression of investment rate on this interaction, a¢ liate xed e¤ects,
year xed e¤ects and additional controls. Panel A reports results using Non-UK multinational
a¢ liates that operate in the UK as a control group. Panel B reports results using stand-alone rms
and rms in domestic groups in the UK as a control group. All variables are dened as in Table 3.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at rm level. ***, **, * denotes signicance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF UK SUBSIDIARIES
(4587,311925]
(1932,4587]
(609,1932]
(236,609]
[21,236]
Notes: This gure shows the distribution of UK-owned a¢ liates in the EU-27 countries.
Numbers in the square brackets refer to the ve quantiles of the sample distribution. The
top 10 industries for the UK and non-UK a¢ liates in the host countries are:
Top-10 Industries of Multinational A¢ liates in Host Countries (NACE)
Low-Tax Countries High-Tax Countries
UK A¢ liates Non-UK A¢ liates UK A¢ liates Non-UK A¢ liates
2120 2910 4671 4671
7311 2932 1920 4511
4730 4671 4675 1920
4635 4646 6120 2910
1200 4511 2120 3511
4711 6202 4672 4646
4673 4651 1200 7010
4719 4711 4646 4669
4646 4730 6190 4651
1920 4690 7311 4711
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Figure A.2. GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE ON INVESTMENT IN THE UK
A. Gross Investment Rate
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Notes: The gure plots the average gross investment rate in 2006-2011 for UKMNE a¢ liates,
UK a¢ liates of domestic company group, and non-UK MNE a¢ liates in the UK. The solid
vertical line depicts the year when the exemption system became e¤ective, and the dashed
vertical line depicts the year when the policy reform was announced.
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Table A.1. MEAN CHARACTERISTICS BY TREATED AND CONTROL GROUP
A: Full Sample UK A¢ liates Non-UK A¢ liates Mean Di¤erence
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean p-value
Investment 18,728 2,685 265,232 737 0.19
Fixed Asset 27,807 16,502 396,023 12,894 0.01
Gross Investment scaled by Lagged Asset 18,421 0.167 261,158 0.059 0.00
Net Investment scaled by Lagged Asset 20,424 -0.042 295,490 -0.060 0.00
Firm-level controls
Sales 28,998 69,610 412,417 50,291 0.00
Cash Flow 23,636 6,118 339,381 3,338 0.00
EBIT Margin 26,962 -0.079 379,458 -0.055 0.00
Sales Growth Rate 22,605 0.211 321,607 0.222 0.04
B: Matched Sample
Investment 4,952 1,854 3,958 2,181 0.43
Fixed Asset 7,342 15,820 5,664 12,984 0.09
Gross Investment scaled by Lagged Asset 4,877 0.124 3,928 0.190 0.05
Net Investment scaled by Lagged Asset 5,440 - 0.007 4,399 0.080 0.00
Firm-level controls
Sales 7,778 52,029.18 6,043 53,959 0.628
Cash Flow 6,359 5,920.06 5,084 4,690 0.424
EBIT Margin 7,562 - 0.120 6,016 - 0.010 0.000
Sales Growth Rate 6,040 0.241 4,945 0.205 0.011
Notes: Notes: Unconsolidated values, in thousand Euros, current prices. All ratios winsor-
ized at top and bottom 0.01 percentile.
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